It's impossible to get a hold of anyone to speak about case information; every time you call the number, it's an automated system, and if you're lucky, the "chat now" feature is available on the website. However, sometimes that says that all agents are busy and logs you out. for 8 years, I've had to contact them to do THEIR job. There's a 2 missed payment stipulation in the chid support court order, signed by a judge, and the judge also suggested the 2 missed payment stipulation where if the NCP misses 2 payments in a row (he's supposed to pay weekly), they put an order to the judge for a bench warrant. Every single time I've contacted child support and asked about this getting enforced, I'm told that first, they have to notify him that he's missed payments, as well as his employer, and let him know he has 10 business days to make x payment. If by the end of those 10 business days (2 full weeks on top of 2 weeks he's already missed), they will put in an order to the judge to see if they can get a bench warrant. So, he can go a month without paying, and all he has to do is pay back a minute amount of money. I've been told I won't receive his tax return unless he owes me $500 or more in arrears, all the while, they're looking at the same case information as me, seeing that the owes me much more than that. What's the point of having people work for you, if you're never going to enforce court orders, give CP the run around, and let NCP get away with not paying for weeks on end?

NCP filed motion to vacate support alleging children are no longer in school (this is false). NCP failed to appear on his own motion, CP took time to prepare proof for the hearing and was forced to take an upaid day off work. NPC is nearly $40k in arrears at the slow rate of $72 per week for (2) children. NCP continues to court abuse CP with frivolous motions in an effort to hinder enforcement proceedings. CP filed enforcement motion and was charged a filing fee to get the money owe to the children. SERIOUSLY???? I have to pay them to do their job??????? NCP had failed to file or provide proof of IRS tax returns since 2010... how is that allowed????? Why aren’t they reporting this to the federal government? Tax fraud is a crime.

I have the letter from IRS on my Federal Tax Offset on Mar 21 2018 in the amount $3300. The letter says the payment is applied against my debt with NJCS. The NJCS answering my call notified me, that the money will be applied in 6 MONTH from now?! By that time I should pay off the rest. BTW, my kids are 29, and 30 yo.
Two years ago my TAX return about $3500 was already missing with NJCS. When I call them next year after that, later they found it:)
NJCS have not apply another two payments in total $1600. Why do I need lawyer to get my money back all the time? Where can I write a complain?

My child support is court ordered to be debited from my child's father's paycheck. I have not received a payment in 4 months. I have been calling the child support hotline and unless you go through different choices, you are not able to speak to a representative right away. If you don't hit the correct buttons/choices, it tells you that it will hang up (which it has). When I try to use the online chat option, it never works. When you finally get through to someone they put you on hold and get back on to tell you that they will have the case manager call you back within 2 business day. Sometimes I have not received a phone call back. When they do call the information is vague and I have to keep calling for anything to be done. At this point an enforcement hearing or bench warrant should have already been issued. I should not have to keep telling them how to do their job. This is not fair to the custodial parent that actually raises the child.

My Child Support payments comes directly out child father's check every week. Unfortunately, i never received them on time, constantly costing me late fees, and missing payment dates. I have not received a payment on time since 9/15/17. I would love for someone to look into this matter! I really believe their is a mismanagement of money with this organization!!!

COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-003456-15

CIVIL ACTION

On Appeal From:
Superior Court of New Jersey
Chancery Division/Family Part
Docket No. FM-01-215-10

Sat Below:
Hon. Jeffrey D. Light, J.S.C.


POINT TWO
PARENTS HAVE A FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTY INTEREST IN THE CUSTODY, CARE, CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT OF THEIR CHILD’S EDUCATION UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.

The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized the fundamental right of natural parents is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, parents to direct the upbringing of their children, especially when the state purports to know better. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality opinion); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 608 (1979); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927). Uniformly, these cases uphold the time honored principle that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining the care, custody, companionship and management of their child’s education and without State interference.
These fundamental rights apply to all parents, and regardless of their marital status. In New Jersey, these fundamental rights apply only to intact married parents. PMSL allows the State to second guess unmarried and divorcing parents decisions when it comes to college education, without any proof a parent is unfit or a potential harm to child may occur. The State claims to have statutory and broad parens patrie power authority to overrule a select class of fit unmarried or divorcing parents’ fundamental rights to control the education of their children. The State cannot, consistently with due process requirements, merely presume that unmarried and divorcing parents are unsuitable and neglectful parents. Parental unfitness must be established and potential harm to child as result of parental decisions. For all the reasons stated in this brief, the State of New Jersey does not have such power it claims to have, unless a parent is proven to be unfit and there is possible harm to a child.
There can be no dispute that New Jersey’s PMSL was developed under the guise of protecting public interest. When a court begins to make rules for the public good, as it said it did in Khalaf v. Khalaf, 58 N.J. 63, 71-72 (1971) without reference to constitutional fundamental principles, it becomes a lawmaking body that has based its decision not on fundamental precepts of law, but rather upon a utilitarian methodology distinctively political in nature. This is precisely how PMSL was created. From a citizen’s perspective, there is also monetary reason for creating and enforcing this law, and it’s not just about a select class of adult children going to college. PMSL allows the State to continue receiving Title IV incentives from our federal government, despite the adult child reaching the age majority. PMSL is intertwined to allow a non-custodial parent to receive an outrageous entitlement of Adult Child Support. The nation’s history and tradition reflects that child support was intended as an obligation of a parent to provide financial, medical and emotional support for a minor. It was never intended to apply to adult children.
WHY PMSL IS CLEARLY REPUGNANT BEYOND A RESONABLE DOUBT- ROUTINELY DISCRIMINATES - MATEREIALLY INTERFERES WITH DIVORCING & UNMARRIED PARENTS, (MAINLY FATHERS) FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTY INTEREST TO CONTROL THE EDUCATION OF THEIR CHILDREN
PMSL is repugnant & unconstitutional pursuant to Meyer v.Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, (1923), in which the Court explained that “this family liberty may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting the public interest” and held that parents have a fundamental right to control the education of their children. 262 U.S. at 399-400. The Court also held that the liberty interest of Parents is protected by U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. See also Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927). As to the State’s position that they have statutory and broad parens patriae power and claim that a select class of children are to be held in common between State and parent, is also repugnant and unconstitutional. Meyer began the long cascade of cases specifically rejecting a broad parens patriae notion the children were held in “common” between State and the parent. Id at 401. See also Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530. Relying on Meyer, the held Court that the statute:
unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control. ... The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.
Plaintiff(s) respectfully submits that New Jersey PMSL, unquestionably interferes with the liberty of a select class of fit unmarried and divorcing parents fundamental right to direct the upbringing and education of their children under their control, and that the statute and case law in question fails to provide the same.
PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional pursuant to Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,(1965), in which the Court emphasized that the state cannot interfere with the right of a parent to control his child’s education. Id.,at 486. The Griswold Court stated that the right to educate one’s child as one chooses is guaranteed in the Bill of Rights and applicable to the States by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Yet, the State of New Jersey continues to claim they have the power to disregard these fundamental rights for a select class of fit parents, while married parent’s fundamental rights are respected. Under the U.S. Constitution, fundamental rights of fit married and unmarried or divorcing parents are entitled to the utmost protection from unwarranted intrusion by the state. In the context of parental rights, each parent is invested with a set of rights in their parent-child relationship, rights which are “essential”, “fundamental”, and “basic”, and the liberty interest to freely exercise all of those rights without interference from the state.
POINT THREE PMSL IS REPUGNANT AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY CAN ONLY OVERRIDE PARENTAL DECISIONS ONLY WHEN IT APPEARS THAT PARENTAL DECISIONS WILL JEOPARDIZE THE HEALTH OR SAFETY OF A CHILD.
The U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment to the rights of natural parents in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972), overturning convictions of Amish parents for removing their children from school before age sixteen. The state's interest in providing universal education had to "yield to ... the interest of parents in directing the rearing of their off-spring." Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213-14. The Yoder Court noted that the state can override parents only where "it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant social burdens." Id. at 233-34. "The primary role of parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition." Id. at 232. For the same precise reasons, PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional.
POINT FOUR PMSL IS REPUGNANT AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY DOES NOT HAVE PARENS PATRIAE POWER TO OVERRULE THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S INTERPRETION OF THE CONSTITUTION
“PMSL” circumvents the Constitutional command that that the exercise of Parens Patriae Power is subject to the United States Constitutional system of Ordered Liberty. See Meyer Id. at 290, ("Determination by the Legislature of what constitutes proper exercise of police power is not final or conclusive but is subject to supervision by the courts."). Particularly after the enactment of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Supreme Court applied due process principles and strict scrutiny analysis to limit state invocations of its Parens Patriae Power. For the same precise reasons, PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional.
Our jurisprudence does not see the child in isolation, but as an extension and ward of his parents, not the state. Parham, 442 U.S. at 602-03 (parents are presumed to “act in their child's best interest”); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401. Children are not merely autonomous individuals needing the cacophony of alternate voices (e.g., state social services, guardian ad litems, educators, etc.) contending to speak on their behalf. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213; Parham, 442 U.S. at 606 (rejecting childhood by committee approach); Guggenheim, What's Wrong with Children's Rights 95 (e.g., assigning independent counsel for a toddler to advance the child's so-called interest is a legal fiction, as that grown-up lawyer assigned is merely advancing what that grown-up envisions as best for the child). Our Constitution rejects the notion that children receive independent consideration “absent a finding of neglect or abuse” by their parents. Parham, 442 U.S. at 604. For the same precise reasons, PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional.
The State and the parent do not stand in equipoise, or have an equal interest in the child. Yet, the State of New Jersey continues to claim that they have an equal interest in a select class of adult children & their custodial parents. Vivek S. Sankaran, Parens Patriae Run Amuck: The Child Welfare System's Disregard for the Rights of Non-Offending Parents, 82 Temple Law Review 55 (Spring 2009) (showing a historical rejection of broad parens patriae doctrine as case law on parental liberty interest was developed in Meyer, Pierce, Prince, Yoder). “The State's interest in caring for … children is de minimis if [the parent] is shown to be fit.” Stanley, 405 U.S. at 657-58 (the State “spites its own articulated goals” of child protection when it presumptively and arbitrarily removes children without a due process hearing). The State's parens patriae interest in promoting the welfare of the child is secondary and triggered only where parents have been determined unfit. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 767; For the same precise reasons, PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional.
POINT FIVE PARENTS HAVE A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO RAISE THEIR CHILDREN AS THEY SEE FIT, UNLESS A COURT DETERMINE’S A PARENT IS DEEMED UNFIT AND A POTENTIAL MAY OCCUR TO A CHILD
It is important to emphasize, that there is no Supreme Court precedent saying that Parents Fundamental Liberty Interest to child rearing & controlling the education of their children are lost or diminished in anyway by divorced or a family court proceeding. I will emphasize repeatedly, unmarried and divorcing parents retain the same fundamental rights as married parents. A noncustodial parent does not become less of parent if he or she decides not to pay for private or higher education for their child, or is not in the best interest of a child. A Parent's responsibility does not diminish and the rights which accompany that responsibility remain as well. As the U.S. Supreme Court articulated, “the tradition of parental authority is... one of the basic presuppositions of individual liberty." Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. at 638. The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children. PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional, because it intrudes upon the tradition of parental authority. It also fails to provide a presumption that parents act in the best interest of their children.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has acknowledged that the State lacks a compelling justification for an infringement on the fundamental rights of parents to raise their children as they see fit. See Watkins v. Nelson, 163 N.J. 235 (2000), the Watkins Court determined that only a showing of unfitness, abandonment, gross misconduct or exceptional circumstances would overcome the presumption in favor of the parent, and that "exceptional circumstances" requires proof of serious physical or psychological harm or a substantial likelihood of such harm. For the same precise reason, PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional. Absent a parent being proved unfit and or a potential harm to a child, the Court is without authority to make educational decisions over the objections of fit parents. Watkins explains that avoiding harm to the child is the polestar and the constitutional imperative that is necessary to overcome the presumption in favor of the parent's decision and to justify intrusion into family life. Yet, the State of New Jersey routinely materially interferes with a select class of fit unmarried and divorcing parents fundamental rights in controlling the education of their children, while intact married parents’ fundamental rights are respected. In. N J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 102 (2008), the Court recognized the right of a parents to raise a child and maintain a relationship with that child, without undue interference by the state, is protected by the United States and New Jersey Constitutions.
POINT SIX THE STATE’S PRESUMPTION THAT COLLEGE IS NECESSARY FOR A SELECT CLASS OF ADULT CHILDREN OF DIVORCE OR UNMARRIED PARENTS IS FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED.
The State of New Jersey has a presumption that college is necessary for a select class of adult children of divorce and unmarried families. If this was truly the case, and we lived in a utopian world, all adult children would be required to go to college and all fit parents would be required to foot the cost, not just a select class. As articulated in Yoder, the correct presumption is not that secondary education is necessary, but without it, would it impair the physical or mental health of the child, or result in an inability to be self-supporting or to discharge the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, or in any other way materially detract from the welfare of society? Id. at 205. For the same precise reason, PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional.
POINT SEVEN STATE’S SPECIAL INTEREST PRESUMPTION MUST ALSO BE REJECTED AND DEEMED REPUGNANT AND UNCONSTITIONAL

The State of New Jersey claims that they have a "special interest" in protecting children, and invoking the altruistic language of "best interest," or simply saying that "children have a right to be free from harm" are legally insufficient criteria for "children's rights" and elevating the role of the state into the lives of families. See Martin Guggenheim, What's Wrong with Children's Rights, passim (Harvard University Press 2005). Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 46 3 (1981)(so-called “best interests” standard offers little guidance to judges, and may effectively encourage them to rely on their own personal values). This is precisely the case, in the State of New Jersey. Troxel emphatically rejected the notion that a “best interest of the child” standard is enough for a judge to supplement the decision of a fit parent. The statist notion that government may supersede parental authority in order to ensure bureaucratically or judicially determined "best interests" of children has been rejected as repugnant to American traditions. Judges and state officials are ill-equipped to second guess parents and are precluded from intervening in absence of powerful countervailing interests. See Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1138 (Pa. Super. 1990), citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257-61, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 2991-93, 77 L.Ed. 2d 614, 623-29 (1982). See also Point Four. For the same precise reasons, PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional.
POINT SEVEN A PMSL IS REPUGNANT AND UNCONSTITIONAL UNDER ARTICILE VII, § 4, P P 1 & CONFLICTS WITH N.J.S.A. 18A-38-25
Under Article VIII, § 4, P 1, our State Constitution has established a Constitutional Right for all of its citizens to participate in free public education and has established compulsory attendance requirement that in no case extends to post-secondary education for children of married, unmarried or divorcing parents. See also, N.J.S.A. 18A-38-25, a parent’s compulsory obligation to educate a child terminates upon attaining the age of 16. I do not question the power of a State, having a high responsibility for providing free education of its citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education. However, the State’s only compelling interest with respect to a child’s education is constrained to N.J. Const. Article VIII, § 4, P 1, and N.J.S.A. 18A-38-25.
POINT EIGHT THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY HAS ONLY A DE MINIMIS INTEREST IN A CHILD’S COLLEGE EDUCATION WHEN THEIR PARENTS ARE DEEMED FIT

The State’s presumption that it has a strong interest in the outcome of disputes where the welfare of our young citizens is at stake is misplaced, nor constitutional. The State’s presumption in which they claim to have a strong interest in ensuring that a select class of adult children is educated & that college is necessary so that only a select class of adult children can become more productive members of our society is also constitutionally flawed. The correct constitutional presumption is that the State has little, if any, interest in caring for a child when the child's parent is fit. See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 248 (1978) (“The State's interest in caring for the children is ‘de minimis' if the parent is in fact a fit parent.”). In this case, both fit Parents are presumed to act in the best interest of their child. Thus, the State only has a de minimis interest, and is prevented from second guessing parental decisions. The Fourteenth Amendment prevents the State of New Jersey, from interfering with guaranteed liberty interest of parents to direct the education and upbringing of their children. See also Fawzy v. Fawzy, 199 N.J. 456, 473-475 (2009). For the same precise reasons, PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional.
POINT NINE PMSL IS REPUGNANT AND UNCONSITUTIONAL UNDER ARTICLE ONE AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE 14TH AMENDMENDMENT, AS IT TREATS DIVORCING AND UNMARRIED PARENTS DIFFERENTLY FROM CURRENT MARRIED PARENTS LIVING WITH THEIR CHILDREN.

PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional pursuant to Quilloin v. Walcott, 98 S Ct 549; 434 US 246, 255-56, (1978), the Court implied that "a (once) married father who is separated or divorced from a mother and is no longer living with his child" could not constitutionally be treated differently from a currently married father living with his child. PMSL on its face discriminates and impairs the exercise of unmarried and divorcing parents’ personal and fundamental rights to control the education of their children. See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972). For the same precise reason, PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional.
PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional pursuant to Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267 (1983), in which he Court stated:
(“We have held that these statutes [where mothers and fathers are treated disparately] may not constitutionally be applied in that class of cases where the mother and father are in fact similarly situated with regard to their relationship with the child.”).

PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional pursuant to Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989) (plurality opinion) (“The family unit accorded traditional respect in our society . . . includes the household of unmarried parents and their children”). Yet, the State fails in according the same respect to a select class of fit unmarried and divorcing parents.
POINT NINE A PMSL IS REPUGNANT AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT VIOLATES ARTICLE ONE AND THE EQUAL PROTECTON CLAUSE OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT
At one time, the State of New Jersey upheld both the State and Federal Constitution for all of its citizens. See Ziesel v. Ziesel, 115 A. 435 (N.J. 1921). As decades past, PMSL was developed under the guise of protecting the public interest with a utilitarian methodology that was distinctively political in nature, as well as monetary. In Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20, 37, 42 S. Ct. 449, 66 L. Ed. 817 (1922), the Court stated:
A reviewing court must strike down unconstitutional law even though that law is “designed to promote the highest good. The good sought in this unconstitutional law is an insidious feature, because it leads the courts and legislators of good purpose to promote it, without thought of the serious breach it will make in the ark of our covenant, or the harm which will come from breaking down recognized standards.
The unequal dispensation of fundamental rights of unmarried and divorcing parents can no longer be tolerated under our State and Federal Constitution. This Court is required to utilize the Equal Protection analysis articulated in Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415 (2006), and must hold beyond a reasonable doubt that PMSL is repugnant and violates Article One of the State Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause under the United States Constitution. As Justice Jackson noted, concurring in Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 -113 (1949), made a point:
"The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget today, that there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no better measure to assure that laws will be just than to require that laws be equal in operation."

Under the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution, all fit parents, regardless of their marital status are to be treated equally. As such, unmarried and divorcing parents retain the same fundamental rights as married parents. See Levy v. Louisiana , 88 S.Ct. 1509, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). Any statutory scheme which commands dissimilar treatment for men and women who are similarly situated involves the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Constitution. See also, Frontiero v. Richardson U.S, 93 S.Ct. 1746; 411. 677 (1973).
POINT TEN PMSL IS REPUGNANT AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT VIOLATES PARENTAL AUTOMONY AND PRIVACY RIGHTS OF A SELECT CLASS OF PARENTS
PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional pursuant to Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972), in which the Court implied:
"It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital relationship... . If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Id., at 453.
The concept of privacy or right to be left alone is deeply rooted in our heritage and it is founded upon historical notions and federal constitutional expressions of ordered liberty. Justice Brandeis, sometimes called the father of the idea of privacy, recognized this fundamental right of privacy when he wrote:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. . . They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone – the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S. Ct. 564, 572, 72 L. Ed. 944 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
The United States Supreme Court has fashioned a right of privacy which protects the decision-making or autonomy zone of privacy interests of the individual. The Court's decisions include matters concerning marriage, procreation, contraception, relationships, child rearing, and providing parents a fundamental right to control the education of their children under their control. To permit any governmental interference into these rights, there must be a powerful countervailing interest. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted this interest to mean that there must first be a showing of parental unfitness and a potential harm to the child as a result of the parents' decision. See Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84, (2003), discussing in detail that childrearing autonomy is rooted in the right to privacy. PMSL circumvents the holding in Fawzy v. Fawzy, 199 N.J. 456, 473-475 (2009), the Court state:
“Deference to parental autonomy means that the State does not second-guess parental decision making….[n]or does it impose its own notion of a child’s best interests on a family….Indeed the state has an obligation, under the parens patriae doctrine, to intervene where it is necessary to prevent harm to a child.”
The State of New Jersey does not deny that it routinely overrules educational decisions of a select class of fit unmarried and divorcing parents and imposes its own notion on what is the best interest of an adult child when it comes to college. Similarly, the State does not deny those intact married families’ fundamental rights in controlling the education of their children, and the freedom of personal choices. All parents have a historical right of freedom of personal choice in matters of family life. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753 (emphasizing this “Court's historical recognition that freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). The freedom of personal choice in this case, is a parent’s fundamental right to control the education of their children and, to their right to decide whether or not to contribute towards college. Intact married parents enjoy these rights. Yet, their adult children have no standing whatsoever to force their parents to assist them with college if they refused to do so. Here, the State lacks a compelling interest in second-guessing a fit parent's decision regarding college education for their adult children.
POINT ELEVEN PMSL IS REPUGNANT AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF A SELECT CLASS OF PARENTS
Our State Legislator has allowed the State to infringe upon the fundamental rights of a select class of fit parents to control the education of a child, simply because they believe a family court judge can make a better educational decision. As articulated in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944), there is a “private realm of family life which the state cannot enter” that has been afforded both substantive and procedural protection against arbitrary state intrusion into the intimate relationships of parents and children alike. Similarly, the Court admitted the high responsibilities are right of parents to control the upbringing of their children against that of the State, in which they stated:
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the State can neither supply nor hinder.


In this case, we have a similar situation that was faced in Troxel, a disagreement between two fit Parents. “PMSL” commands dissimilar treatment and discrimination to a select class of Fit Parents to be stripped of their fundamental right to control the education of a child, simply because the State has allowed a judge impliedly determine that they can make a better educational college decisions. It is axiomatic that there is an essential difference between the State and the family under our form of government. Each has a responsibility to govern within its sphere of authority. Simply because the decision of a parent is not agreeable to a child or because it involves risks does not automatically transfer the power to make that decision from the parents to some agency or officer of the state. In Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) Supreme Court of the United States said the following:
“The Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a judge believes a ‘better’ decision could be made.”

See Point Four and Point Seven. For the same precise reasons, PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional.
POINT TWELVE PMSL IS REPUGNANT-UNCONSTITUTIONAL & VOID PURSUANT COOPER VS. AARON
Neither the Legislator nor the Executive Branch has the authority to overrule, or create legislation under the guise of protecting the public interest, that is contrary to rulings from the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution. It is respectfully submitted beyond a reasonable doubt, that New Jersey’s PMSL materially interferes & unquestionably discriminates against divorcing & unmarried parents’ fundamental rights and liberty interest to control the education of their children. The Supreme Court has provided every citizen a fundamental right to control the education of their children, without State interference. The 4th and 5th Amendments were described as protection against all governmental invasions of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. The Court referred to the 4th Amendment as creating a right to privacy, no less important than any other right carefully and particularly reserved to the people. Reaffirming the principles set forth in Pierce v. Society of Sisters and Meyers v Nebraska. Griswold v Connecticut 381 US 479 (1965).
As Jus¬tice Story explained 200 years ago, if state courts were permitted to disregard this Court’s rulings on federal law, “the laws, the treaties, and the constitution of the United States would be different in different states, and might, perhaps, never have precisely the same construction, obligation, or efficacy, in any two states. The public mis-chiefs that would attend such a state of things would be truly deplorable.” Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 348 (1816). For all the reasons articulated in this Brief, New Jersey’s “PMSL” is repugnant, unconstitutional & void, beyond a reasonable doubt, pursuant to Cooper vs. Aaron, 358 U.S. 178 S. Ct. 1401 (1958), in which:
The Court held if a judge does not fully comply with the Constitution, then his orders are void. The protection of the Federal Constitution extends to all. All State Legislature & Judges have an affirmative duty to obey rulings from the United States Supreme Court interpretation of the United States Constitution. A state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it. Chief Justice Marshall spoke for a unanimous Court in saying that: ‘If the legislatures of the several states may, at will, annul the judgments of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights acquired under those judgments, the constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery.’ United States v. Peters, 5 Cranch 115, 136, 3 L.Ed. 53.

The State of New Jersey does not have the power to suspend the Constitution, only the President of the United States can in a time of war. Unless the State of New Jersey can prove they have the authority to overrule the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution, the authority disregard the fundamental rights of unmarried or divorcing parents, the order compelling plaintiff(s) to pay for college contribution is void. See also Point Four & Seven. The U.S. Supreme Court in discussing the constitutionality of a state law that impinges upon a fundamental right held, “It is of course true that a law that impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly secured by the Constitution is presumptively unconstitutional. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).”
STRICT SCRUITY IS REQUIRED
Moriarty v. Bradt, 827 A.2d 203, 214–15 (N.J. 2003), Summing up when the State seeks, by statute, to interfere with family and parental autonomy, a fundamental right is at issue. That statute thus is subject to strict scrutiny and will only pass muster if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21; and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56.)

CONCLUSION
The idea of the American Dream is rooted in the United States Declaration of Independence which proclaims that "all men are created equal" and that they are "endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights" including "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. Since its founding in 1776, the United States has regarded and promoted itself as an Empire of Liberty and prosperity. Any healthy adult child has the ability to go to college with or without parental help. The adult child has the ability to work & earn a living. They have the option of going to college full or part time. They have the ability to apply for student loans & pay them back in due course, as would any Adult reaching the age of majority. They also have the ability to apply for grants. Finally, they have the ability to serve our military to help pay for college. It is true that it may be inconvenient for an adult child to pay his or her own way through private college, but there is no legal reason whatsoever why an Adult Child should not do so if otherwise healthy and able-bodied. An Adult Child is not in need of support merely because he or she is in school. A decision of parents as to whether or not the adult child should go to college & who shall pay for those educational expenses are matters of right that are purely personal, private, moral and guaranteed fundamental to the parents & the child. Indeed some parents are willingly & capable of assisting their children in obtaining a higher education, but any compulsory duty would offend the Parents guaranteed liberty interest to control the education of their child, notwithstanding that judges are prohibited from making child rearing educational decisions, unless a parent is unfit and a child can be potentially harmed.
“PMSL” appears to grant favoritism & special rights to a select class of custodial parents & their Adult Children, while totally disregarding our State and Federal Constitution. Our Legislator & Courts presumes these Adult Children are disadvantage. This presumption is misplaced and does not rise to a level of harm. The correct constitutional presumption is that a fit parent will act in the best interest of his or her child. Absent of harm or a parent being unfit, the State or the Court may not intervene in private educational disputes. Yet another issue deserves consideration here. While a regimen of legal protections for children whose parents abuse or neglect them is surely just and necessary, where did our state legislators and case law get the idea that the rights of children to their “best interests” are automatically superior to the fundamental Constitutional rights of their fit parents?
For reasons unknown, the State refuses to recognize that there is a presumption that fit parents act in their children's best interests, Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602; there is normally no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question fit parents' ability to make the best decisions regarding their children, see, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that the Amendment's Due Process Clause, like its Fifth Amendment counterpart, "guarantees more than fair process." Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997). The Clause also includes a substantive component that "provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests." Id., at 720; see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-302 (1993). PMSL is so beyond a reasonable doubt in conflict with the State & Federal Constitution that it should be stricken down as invalid. This Court is required to uphold your constitutional duty and protect the fundamental rights of all fit parents, not just married parents.
Respectfully submitted,

COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-003456-15

CIVIL ACTION

On Appeal From:
Superior Court of New Jersey
Chancery Division/Family Part
Docket No. FM-01-215-10

Sat Below:
Hon. Jeffrey D. Light, J.S.C.


POINT TWO
PARENTS HAVE A FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTY INTEREST IN THE CUSTODY, CARE, CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT OF THEIR CHILD’S EDUCATION UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.

The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized the fundamental right of natural parents is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, parents to direct the upbringing of their children, especially when the state purports to know better. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality opinion); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 608 (1979); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927). Uniformly, these cases uphold the time honored principle that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining the care, custody, companionship and management of their child’s education and without State interference.
These fundamental rights apply to all parents, and regardless of their marital status. In New Jersey, these fundamental rights apply only to intact married parents. PMSL allows the State to second guess unmarried and divorcing parents decisions when it comes to college education, without any proof a parent is unfit or a potential harm to child may occur. The State claims to have statutory and broad parens patrie power authority to overrule a select class of fit unmarried or divorcing parents’ fundamental rights to control the education of their children. The State cannot, consistently with due process requirements, merely presume that unmarried and divorcing parents are unsuitable and neglectful parents. Parental unfitness must be established and potential harm to child as result of parental decisions. For all the reasons stated in this brief, the State of New Jersey does not have such power it claims to have, unless a parent is proven to be unfit and there is possible harm to a child.
There can be no dispute that New Jersey’s PMSL was developed under the guise of protecting public interest. When a court begins to make rules for the public good, as it said it did in Khalaf v. Khalaf, 58 N.J. 63, 71-72 (1971) without reference to constitutional fundamental principles, it becomes a lawmaking body that has based its decision not on fundamental precepts of law, but rather upon a utilitarian methodology distinctively political in nature. This is precisely how PMSL was created. From a citizen’s perspective, there is also monetary reason for creating and enforcing this law, and it’s not just about a select class of adult children going to college. PMSL allows the State to continue receiving Title IV incentives from our federal government, despite the adult child reaching the age majority. PMSL is intertwined to allow a non-custodial parent to receive an outrageous entitlement of Adult Child Support. The nation’s history and tradition reflects that child support was intended as an obligation of a parent to provide financial, medical and emotional support for a minor. It was never intended to apply to adult children.
WHY PMSL IS CLEARLY REPUGNANT BEYOND A RESONABLE DOUBT- ROUTINELY DISCRIMINATES - MATEREIALLY INTERFERES WITH DIVORCING & UNMARRIED PARENTS, (MAINLY FATHERS) FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTY INTEREST TO CONTROL THE EDUCATION OF THEIR CHILDREN
PMSL is repugnant & unconstitutional pursuant to Meyer v.Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, (1923), in which the Court explained that “this family liberty may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting the public interest” and held that parents have a fundamental right to control the education of their children. 262 U.S. at 399-400. The Court also held that the liberty interest of Parents is protected by U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. See also Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927). As to the State’s position that they have statutory and broad parens patriae power and claim that a select class of children are to be held in common between State and parent, is also repugnant and unconstitutional. Meyer began the long cascade of cases specifically rejecting a broad parens patriae notion the children were held in “common” between State and the parent. Id at 401. See also Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530. Relying on Meyer, the held Court that the statute:
unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control. ... The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.
Plaintiff(s) respectfully submits that New Jersey PMSL, unquestionably interferes with the liberty of a select class of fit unmarried and divorcing parents fundamental right to direct the upbringing and education of their children under their control, and that the statute and case law in question fails to provide the same.
PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional pursuant to Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,(1965), in which the Court emphasized that the state cannot interfere with the right of a parent to control his child’s education. Id.,at 486. The Griswold Court stated that the right to educate one’s child as one chooses is guaranteed in the Bill of Rights and applicable to the States by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Yet, the State of New Jersey continues to claim they have the power to disregard these fundamental rights for a select class of fit parents, while married parent’s fundamental rights are respected. Under the U.S. Constitution, fundamental rights of fit married and unmarried or divorcing parents are entitled to the utmost protection from unwarranted intrusion by the state. In the context of parental rights, each parent is invested with a set of rights in their parent-child relationship, rights which are “essential”, “fundamental”, and “basic”, and the liberty interest to freely exercise all of those rights without interference from the state.
POINT THREE PMSL IS REPUGNANT AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY CAN ONLY OVERRIDE PARENTAL DECISIONS ONLY WHEN IT APPEARS THAT PARENTAL DECISIONS WILL JEOPARDIZE THE HEALTH OR SAFETY OF A CHILD.
The U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment to the rights of natural parents in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972), overturning convictions of Amish parents for removing their children from school before age sixteen. The state's interest in providing universal education had to "yield to ... the interest of parents in directing the rearing of their off-spring." Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213-14. The Yoder Court noted that the state can override parents only where "it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant social burdens." Id. at 233-34. "The primary role of parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition." Id. at 232. For the same precise reasons, PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional.
POINT FOUR PMSL IS REPUGNANT AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY DOES NOT HAVE PARENS PATRIAE POWER TO OVERRULE THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S INTERPRETION OF THE CONSTITUTION
“PMSL” circumvents the Constitutional command that that the exercise of Parens Patriae Power is subject to the United States Constitutional system of Ordered Liberty. See Meyer Id. at 290, ("Determination by the Legislature of what constitutes proper exercise of police power is not final or conclusive but is subject to supervision by the courts."). Particularly after the enactment of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Supreme Court applied due process principles and strict scrutiny analysis to limit state invocations of its Parens Patriae Power. For the same precise reasons, PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional.
Our jurisprudence does not see the child in isolation, but as an extension and ward of his parents, not the state. Parham, 442 U.S. at 602-03 (parents are presumed to “act in their child's best interest”); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401. Children are not merely autonomous individuals needing the cacophony of alternate voices (e.g., state social services, guardian ad litems, educators, etc.) contending to speak on their behalf. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213; Parham, 442 U.S. at 606 (rejecting childhood by committee approach); Guggenheim, What's Wrong with Children's Rights 95 (e.g., assigning independent counsel for a toddler to advance the child's so-called interest is a legal fiction, as that grown-up lawyer assigned is merely advancing what that grown-up envisions as best for the child). Our Constitution rejects the notion that children receive independent consideration “absent a finding of neglect or abuse” by their parents. Parham, 442 U.S. at 604. For the same precise reasons, PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional.
The State and the parent do not stand in equipoise, or have an equal interest in the child. Yet, the State of New Jersey continues to claim that they have an equal interest in a select class of adult children & their custodial parents. Vivek S. Sankaran, Parens Patriae Run Amuck: The Child Welfare System's Disregard for the Rights of Non-Offending Parents, 82 Temple Law Review 55 (Spring 2009) (showing a historical rejection of broad parens patriae doctrine as case law on parental liberty interest was developed in Meyer, Pierce, Prince, Yoder). “The State's interest in caring for … children is de minimis if [the parent] is shown to be fit.” Stanley, 405 U.S. at 657-58 (the State “spites its own articulated goals” of child protection when it presumptively and arbitrarily removes children without a due process hearing). The State's parens patriae interest in promoting the welfare of the child is secondary and triggered only where parents have been determined unfit. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 767; For the same precise reasons, PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional.
POINT FIVE PARENTS HAVE A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO RAISE THEIR CHILDREN AS THEY SEE FIT, UNLESS A COURT DETERMINE’S A PARENT IS DEEMED UNFIT AND A POTENTIAL MAY OCCUR TO A CHILD
It is important to emphasize, that there is no Supreme Court precedent saying that Parents Fundamental Liberty Interest to child rearing & controlling the education of their children are lost or diminished in anyway by divorced or a family court proceeding. I will emphasize repeatedly, unmarried and divorcing parents retain the same fundamental rights as married parents. A noncustodial parent does not become less of parent if he or she decides not to pay for private or higher education for their child, or is not in the best interest of a child. A Parent's responsibility does not diminish and the rights which accompany that responsibility remain as well. As the U.S. Supreme Court articulated, “the tradition of parental authority is... one of the basic presuppositions of individual liberty." Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. at 638. The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children. PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional, because it intrudes upon the tradition of parental authority. It also fails to provide a presumption that parents act in the best interest of their children.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has acknowledged that the State lacks a compelling justification for an infringement on the fundamental rights of parents to raise their children as they see fit. See Watkins v. Nelson, 163 N.J. 235 (2000), the Watkins Court determined that only a showing of unfitness, abandonment, gross misconduct or exceptional circumstances would overcome the presumption in favor of the parent, and that "exceptional circumstances" requires proof of serious physical or psychological harm or a substantial likelihood of such harm. For the same precise reason, PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional. Absent a parent being proved unfit and or a potential harm to a child, the Court is without authority to make educational decisions over the objections of fit parents. Watkins explains that avoiding harm to the child is the polestar and the constitutional imperative that is necessary to overcome the presumption in favor of the parent's decision and to justify intrusion into family life. Yet, the State of New Jersey routinely materially interferes with a select class of fit unmarried and divorcing parents fundamental rights in controlling the education of their children, while intact married parents’ fundamental rights are respected. In. N J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 102 (2008), the Court recognized the right of a parents to raise a child and maintain a relationship with that child, without undue interference by the state, is protected by the United States and New Jersey Constitutions.
POINT SIX THE STATE’S PRESUMPTION THAT COLLEGE IS NECESSARY FOR A SELECT CLASS OF ADULT CHILDREN OF DIVORCE OR UNMARRIED PARENTS IS FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED.
The State of New Jersey has a presumption that college is necessary for a select class of adult children of divorce and unmarried families. If this was truly the case, and we lived in a utopian world, all adult children would be required to go to college and all fit parents would be required to foot the cost, not just a select class. As articulated in Yoder, the correct presumption is not that secondary education is necessary, but without it, would it impair the physical or mental health of the child, or result in an inability to be self-supporting or to discharge the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, or in any other way materially detract from the welfare of society? Id. at 205. For the same precise reason, PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional.
POINT SEVEN STATE’S SPECIAL INTEREST PRESUMPTION MUST ALSO BE REJECTED AND DEEMED REPUGNANT AND UNCONSTITIONAL

The State of New Jersey claims that they have a "special interest" in protecting children, and invoking the altruistic language of "best interest," or simply saying that "children have a right to be free from harm" are legally insufficient criteria for "children's rights" and elevating the role of the state into the lives of families. See Martin Guggenheim, What's Wrong with Children's Rights, passim (Harvard University Press 2005). Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 46 3 (1981)(so-called “best interests” standard offers little guidance to judges, and may effectively encourage them to rely on their own personal values). This is precisely the case, in the State of New Jersey. Troxel emphatically rejected the notion that a “best interest of the child” standard is enough for a judge to supplement the decision of a fit parent. The statist notion that government may supersede parental authority in order to ensure bureaucratically or judicially determined "best interests" of children has been rejected as repugnant to American traditions. Judges and state officials are ill-equipped to second guess parents and are precluded from intervening in absence of powerful countervailing interests. See Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1138 (Pa. Super. 1990), citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257-61, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 2991-93, 77 L.Ed. 2d 614, 623-29 (1982). See also Point Four. For the same precise reasons, PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional.
POINT SEVEN A PMSL IS REPUGNANT AND UNCONSTITIONAL UNDER ARTICILE VII, § 4, P P 1 & CONFLICTS WITH N.J.S.A. 18A-38-25
Under Article VIII, § 4, P 1, our State Constitution has established a Constitutional Right for all of its citizens to participate in free public education and has established compulsory attendance requirement that in no case extends to post-secondary education for children of married, unmarried or divorcing parents. See also, N.J.S.A. 18A-38-25, a parent’s compulsory obligation to educate a child terminates upon attaining the age of 16. I do not question the power of a State, having a high responsibility for providing free education of its citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education. However, the State’s only compelling interest with respect to a child’s education is constrained to N.J. Const. Article VIII, § 4, P 1, and N.J.S.A. 18A-38-25.
POINT EIGHT THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY HAS ONLY A DE MINIMIS INTEREST IN A CHILD’S COLLEGE EDUCATION WHEN THEIR PARENTS ARE DEEMED FIT

The State’s presumption that it has a strong interest in the outcome of disputes where the welfare of our young citizens is at stake is misplaced, nor constitutional. The State’s presumption in which they claim to have a strong interest in ensuring that a select class of adult children is educated & that college is necessary so that only a select class of adult children can become more productive members of our society is also constitutionally flawed. The correct constitutional presumption is that the State has little, if any, interest in caring for a child when the child's parent is fit. See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 248 (1978) (“The State's interest in caring for the children is ‘de minimis' if the parent is in fact a fit parent.”). In this case, both fit Parents are presumed to act in the best interest of their child. Thus, the State only has a de minimis interest, and is prevented from second guessing parental decisions. The Fourteenth Amendment prevents the State of New Jersey, from interfering with guaranteed liberty interest of parents to direct the education and upbringing of their children. See also Fawzy v. Fawzy, 199 N.J. 456, 473-475 (2009). For the same precise reasons, PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional.
POINT NINE PMSL IS REPUGNANT AND UNCONSITUTIONAL UNDER ARTICLE ONE AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE 14TH AMENDMENDMENT, AS IT TREATS DIVORCING AND UNMARRIED PARENTS DIFFERENTLY FROM CURRENT MARRIED PARENTS LIVING WITH THEIR CHILDREN.

PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional pursuant to Quilloin v. Walcott, 98 S Ct 549; 434 US 246, 255-56, (1978), the Court implied that "a (once) married father who is separated or divorced from a mother and is no longer living with his child" could not constitutionally be treated differently from a currently married father living with his child. PMSL on its face discriminates and impairs the exercise of unmarried and divorcing parents’ personal and fundamental rights to control the education of their children. See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972). For the same precise reason, PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional.
PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional pursuant to Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267 (1983), in which he Court stated:
(“We have held that these statutes [where mothers and fathers are treated disparately] may not constitutionally be applied in that class of cases where the mother and father are in fact similarly situated with regard to their relationship with the child.”).

PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional pursuant to Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989) (plurality opinion) (“The family unit accorded traditional respect in our society . . . includes the household of unmarried parents and their children”). Yet, the State fails in according the same respect to a select class of fit unmarried and divorcing parents.
POINT NINE A PMSL IS REPUGNANT AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT VIOLATES ARTICLE ONE AND THE EQUAL PROTECTON CLAUSE OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT
At one time, the State of New Jersey upheld both the State and Federal Constitution for all of its citizens. See Ziesel v. Ziesel, 115 A. 435 (N.J. 1921). As decades past, PMSL was developed under the guise of protecting the public interest with a utilitarian methodology that was distinctively political in nature, as well as monetary. In Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20, 37, 42 S. Ct. 449, 66 L. Ed. 817 (1922), the Court stated:
A reviewing court must strike down unconstitutional law even though that law is “designed to promote the highest good. The good sought in this unconstitutional law is an insidious feature, because it leads the courts and legislators of good purpose to promote it, without thought of the serious breach it will make in the ark of our covenant, or the harm which will come from breaking down recognized standards.
The unequal dispensation of fundamental rights of unmarried and divorcing parents can no longer be tolerated under our State and Federal Constitution. This Court is required to utilize the Equal Protection analysis articulated in Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415 (2006), and must hold beyond a reasonable doubt that PMSL is repugnant and violates Article One of the State Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause under the United States Constitution. As Justice Jackson noted, concurring in Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 -113 (1949), made a point:
"The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget today, that there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no better measure to assure that laws will be just than to require that laws be equal in operation."

Under the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution, all fit parents, regardless of their marital status are to be treated equally. As such, unmarried and divorcing parents retain the same fundamental rights as married parents. See Levy v. Louisiana , 88 S.Ct. 1509, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). Any statutory scheme which commands dissimilar treatment for men and women who are similarly situated involves the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Constitution. See also, Frontiero v. Richardson U.S, 93 S.Ct. 1746; 411. 677 (1973).
POINT TEN PMSL IS REPUGNANT AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT VIOLATES PARENTAL AUTOMONY AND PRIVACY RIGHTS OF A SELECT CLASS OF PARENTS
PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional pursuant to Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972), in which the Court implied:
"It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital relationship... . If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Id., at 453.
The concept of privacy or right to be left alone is deeply rooted in our heritage and it is founded upon historical notions and federal constitutional expressions of ordered liberty. Justice Brandeis, sometimes called the father of the idea of privacy, recognized this fundamental right of privacy when he wrote:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. . . They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone – the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S. Ct. 564, 572, 72 L. Ed. 944 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
The United States Supreme Court has fashioned a right of privacy which protects the decision-making or autonomy zone of privacy interests of the individual. The Court's decisions include matters concerning marriage, procreation, contraception, relationships, child rearing, and providing parents a fundamental right to control the education of their children under their control. To permit any governmental interference into these rights, there must be a powerful countervailing interest. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted this interest to mean that there must first be a showing of parental unfitness and a potential harm to the child as a result of the parents' decision. See Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84, (2003), discussing in detail that childrearing autonomy is rooted in the right to privacy. PMSL circumvents the holding in Fawzy v. Fawzy, 199 N.J. 456, 473-475 (2009), the Court state:
“Deference to parental autonomy means that the State does not second-guess parental decision making….[n]or does it impose its own notion of a child’s best interests on a family….Indeed the state has an obligation, under the parens patriae doctrine, to intervene where it is necessary to prevent harm to a child.”
The State of New Jersey does not deny that it routinely overrules educational decisions of a select class of fit unmarried and divorcing parents and imposes its own notion on what is the best interest of an adult child when it comes to college. Similarly, the State does not deny those intact married families’ fundamental rights in controlling the education of their children, and the freedom of personal choices. All parents have a historical right of freedom of personal choice in matters of family life. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753 (emphasizing this “Court's historical recognition that freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). The freedom of personal choice in this case, is a parent’s fundamental right to control the education of their children and, to their right to decide whether or not to contribute towards college. Intact married parents enjoy these rights. Yet, their adult children have no standing whatsoever to force their parents to assist them with college if they refused to do so. Here, the State lacks a compelling interest in second-guessing a fit parent's decision regarding college education for their adult children.
POINT ELEVEN PMSL IS REPUGNANT AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF A SELECT CLASS OF PARENTS
Our State Legislator has allowed the State to infringe upon the fundamental rights of a select class of fit parents to control the education of a child, simply because they believe a family court judge can make a better educational decision. As articulated in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944), there is a “private realm of family life which the state cannot enter” that has been afforded both substantive and procedural protection against arbitrary state intrusion into the intimate relationships of parents and children alike. Similarly, the Court admitted the high responsibilities are right of parents to control the upbringing of their children against that of the State, in which they stated:
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the State can neither supply nor hinder.


In this case, we have a similar situation that was faced in Troxel, a disagreement between two fit Parents. “PMSL” commands dissimilar treatment and discrimination to a select class of Fit Parents to be stripped of their fundamental right to control the education of a child, simply because the State has allowed a judge impliedly determine that they can make a better educational college decisions. It is axiomatic that there is an essential difference between the State and the family under our form of government. Each has a responsibility to govern within its sphere of authority. Simply because the decision of a parent is not agreeable to a child or because it involves risks does not automatically transfer the power to make that decision from the parents to some agency or officer of the state. In Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) Supreme Court of the United States said the following:
“The Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a judge believes a ‘better’ decision could be made.”

See Point Four and Point Seven. For the same precise reasons, PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional.
POINT TWELVE PMSL IS REPUGNANT-UNCONSTITUTIONAL & VOID PURSUANT COOPER VS. AARON
Neither the Legislator nor the Executive Branch has the authority to overrule, or create legislation under the guise of protecting the public interest, that is contrary to rulings from the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution. It is respectfully submitted beyond a reasonable doubt, that New Jersey’s PMSL materially interferes & unquestionably discriminates against divorcing & unmarried parents’ fundamental rights and liberty interest to control the education of their children. The Supreme Court has provided every citizen a fundamental right to control the education of their children, without State interference. The 4th and 5th Amendments were described as protection against all governmental invasions of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. The Court referred to the 4th Amendment as creating a right to privacy, no less important than any other right carefully and particularly reserved to the people. Reaffirming the principles set forth in Pierce v. Society of Sisters and Meyers v Nebraska. Griswold v Connecticut 381 US 479 (1965).
As Jus¬tice Story explained 200 years ago, if state courts were permitted to disregard this Court’s rulings on federal law, “the laws, the treaties, and the constitution of the United States would be different in different states, and might, perhaps, never have precisely the same construction, obligation, or efficacy, in any two states. The public mis-chiefs that would attend such a state of things would be truly deplorable.” Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 348 (1816). For all the reasons articulated in this Brief, New Jersey’s “PMSL” is repugnant, unconstitutional & void, beyond a reasonable doubt, pursuant to Cooper vs. Aaron, 358 U.S. 178 S. Ct. 1401 (1958), in which:
The Court held if a judge does not fully comply with the Constitution, then his orders are void. The protection of the Federal Constitution extends to all. All State Legislature & Judges have an affirmative duty to obey rulings from the United States Supreme Court interpretation of the United States Constitution. A state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it. Chief Justice Marshall spoke for a unanimous Court in saying that: ‘If the legislatures of the several states may, at will, annul the judgments of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights acquired under those judgments, the constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery.’ United States v. Peters, 5 Cranch 115, 136, 3 L.Ed. 53.

The State of New Jersey does not have the power to suspend the Constitution, only the President of the United States can in a time of war. Unless the State of New Jersey can prove they have the authority to overrule the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution, the authority disregard the fundamental rights of unmarried or divorcing parents, the order compelling plaintiff(s) to pay for college contribution is void. See also Point Four & Seven. The U.S. Supreme Court in discussing the constitutionality of a state law that impinges upon a fundamental right held, “It is of course true that a law that impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly secured by the Constitution is presumptively unconstitutional. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).”
STRICT SCRUITY IS REQUIRED
Moriarty v. Bradt, 827 A.2d 203, 214–15 (N.J. 2003), Summing up when the State seeks, by statute, to interfere with family and parental autonomy, a fundamental right is at issue. That statute thus is subject to strict scrutiny and will only pass muster if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21; and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56.)

CONCLUSION
The idea of the American Dream is rooted in the United States Declaration of Independence which proclaims that "all men are created equal" and that they are "endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights" including "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. Since its founding in 1776, the United States has regarded and promoted itself as an Empire of Liberty and prosperity. Any healthy adult child has the ability to go to college with or without parental help. The adult child has the ability to work & earn a living. They have the option of going to college full or part time. They have the ability to apply for student loans & pay them back in due course, as would any Adult reaching the age of majority. They also have the ability to apply for grants. Finally, they have the ability to serve our military to help pay for college. It is true that it may be inconvenient for an adult child to pay his or her own way through private college, but there is no legal reason whatsoever why an Adult Child should not do so if otherwise healthy and able-bodied. An Adult Child is not in need of support merely because he or she is in school. A decision of parents as to whether or not the adult child should go to college & who shall pay for those educational expenses are matters of right that are purely personal, private, moral and guaranteed fundamental to the parents & the child. Indeed some parents are willingly & capable of assisting their children in obtaining a higher education, but any compulsory duty would offend the Parents guaranteed liberty interest to control the education of their child, notwithstanding that judges are prohibited from making child rearing educational decisions, unless a parent is unfit and a child can be potentially harmed.
“PMSL” appears to grant favoritism & special rights to a select class of custodial parents & their Adult Children, while totally disregarding our State and Federal Constitution. Our Legislator & Courts presumes these Adult Children are disadvantage. This presumption is misplaced and does not rise to a level of harm. The correct constitutional presumption is that a fit parent will act in the best interest of his or her child. Absent of harm or a parent being unfit, the State or the Court may not intervene in private educational disputes. Yet another issue deserves consideration here. While a regimen of legal protections for children whose parents abuse or neglect them is surely just and necessary, where did our state legislators and case law get the idea that the rights of children to their “best interests” are automatically superior to the fundamental Constitutional rights of their fit parents?
For reasons unknown, the State refuses to recognize that there is a presumption that fit parents act in their children's best interests, Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602; there is normally no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question fit parents' ability to make the best decisions regarding their children, see, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that the Amendment's Due Process Clause, like its Fifth Amendment counterpart, "guarantees more than fair process." Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997). The Clause also includes a substantive component that "provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests." Id., at 720; see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-302 (1993). PMSL is so beyond a reasonable doubt in conflict with the State & Federal Constitution that it should be stricken down as invalid. This Court is required to uphold your constitutional duty and protect the fundamental rights of all fit parents, not just married parents.
Respectfully submitted,

COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-003456-15

CIVIL ACTION

On Appeal From:
Superior Court of New Jersey
Chancery Division/Family Part
Docket No. FM-01-215-10

Sat Below:
Hon. Jeffrey D. Light, J.S.C.


POINT TWO
PARENTS HAVE A FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTY INTEREST IN THE CUSTODY, CARE, CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT OF THEIR CHILD’S EDUCATION UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.

The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized the fundamental right of natural parents is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, parents to direct the upbringing of their children, especially when the state purports to know better. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality opinion); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 608 (1979); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927). Uniformly, these cases uphold the time honored principle that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining the care, custody, companionship and management of their child’s education and without State interference.
These fundamental rights apply to all parents, and regardless of their marital status. In New Jersey, these fundamental rights apply only to intact married parents. PMSL allows the State to second guess unmarried and divorcing parents decisions when it comes to college education, without any proof a parent is unfit or a potential harm to child may occur. The State claims to have statutory and broad parens patrie power authority to overrule a select class of fit unmarried or divorcing parents’ fundamental rights to control the education of their children. The State cannot, consistently with due process requirements, merely presume that unmarried and divorcing parents are unsuitable and neglectful parents. Parental unfitness must be established and potential harm to child as result of parental decisions. For all the reasons stated in this brief, the State of New Jersey does not have such power it claims to have, unless a parent is proven to be unfit and there is possible harm to a child.
There can be no dispute that New Jersey’s PMSL was developed under the guise of protecting public interest. When a court begins to make rules for the public good, as it said it did in Khalaf v. Khalaf, 58 N.J. 63, 71-72 (1971) without reference to constitutional fundamental principles, it becomes a lawmaking body that has based its decision not on fundamental precepts of law, but rather upon a utilitarian methodology distinctively political in nature. This is precisely how PMSL was created. From a citizen’s perspective, there is also monetary reason for creating and enforcing this law, and it’s not just about a select class of adult children going to college. PMSL allows the State to continue receiving Title IV incentives from our federal government, despite the adult child reaching the age majority. PMSL is intertwined to allow a non-custodial parent to receive an outrageous entitlement of Adult Child Support. The nation’s history and tradition reflects that child support was intended as an obligation of a parent to provide financial, medical and emotional support for a minor. It was never intended to apply to adult children.
WHY PMSL IS CLEARLY REPUGNANT BEYOND A RESONABLE DOUBT- ROUTINELY DISCRIMINATES - MATEREIALLY INTERFERES WITH DIVORCING & UNMARRIED PARENTS, (MAINLY FATHERS) FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTY INTEREST TO CONTROL THE EDUCATION OF THEIR CHILDREN
PMSL is repugnant & unconstitutional pursuant to Meyer v.Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, (1923), in which the Court explained that “this family liberty may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting the public interest” and held that parents have a fundamental right to control the education of their children. 262 U.S. at 399-400. The Court also held that the liberty interest of Parents is protected by U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. See also Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927). As to the State’s position that they have statutory and broad parens patriae power and claim that a select class of children are to be held in common between State and parent, is also repugnant and unconstitutional. Meyer began the long cascade of cases specifically rejecting a broad parens patriae notion the children were held in “common” between State and the parent. Id at 401. See also Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530. Relying on Meyer, the held Court that the statute:
unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control. ... The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.
Plaintiff(s) respectfully submits that New Jersey PMSL, unquestionably interferes with the liberty of a select class of fit unmarried and divorcing parents fundamental right to direct the upbringing and education of their children under their control, and that the statute and case law in question fails to provide the same.
PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional pursuant to Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,(1965), in which the Court emphasized that the state cannot interfere with the right of a parent to control his child’s education. Id.,at 486. The Griswold Court stated that the right to educate one’s child as one chooses is guaranteed in the Bill of Rights and applicable to the States by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Yet, the State of New Jersey continues to claim they have the power to disregard these fundamental rights for a select class of fit parents, while married parent’s fundamental rights are respected. Under the U.S. Constitution, fundamental rights of fit married and unmarried or divorcing parents are entitled to the utmost protection from unwarranted intrusion by the state. In the context of parental rights, each parent is invested with a set of rights in their parent-child relationship, rights which are “essential”, “fundamental”, and “basic”, and the liberty interest to freely exercise all of those rights without interference from the state.
POINT THREE PMSL IS REPUGNANT AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY CAN ONLY OVERRIDE PARENTAL DECISIONS ONLY WHEN IT APPEARS THAT PARENTAL DECISIONS WILL JEOPARDIZE THE HEALTH OR SAFETY OF A CHILD.
The U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment to the rights of natural parents in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972), overturning convictions of Amish parents for removing their children from school before age sixteen. The state's interest in providing universal education had to "yield to ... the interest of parents in directing the rearing of their off-spring." Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213-14. The Yoder Court noted that the state can override parents only where "it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant social burdens." Id. at 233-34. "The primary role of parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition." Id. at 232. For the same precise reasons, PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional.
POINT FOUR PMSL IS REPUGNANT AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY DOES NOT HAVE PARENS PATRIAE POWER TO OVERRULE THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S INTERPRETION OF THE CONSTITUTION
“PMSL” circumvents the Constitutional command that that the exercise of Parens Patriae Power is subject to the United States Constitutional system of Ordered Liberty. See Meyer Id. at 290, ("Determination by the Legislature of what constitutes proper exercise of police power is not final or conclusive but is subject to supervision by the courts."). Particularly after the enactment of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Supreme Court applied due process principles and strict scrutiny analysis to limit state invocations of its Parens Patriae Power. For the same precise reasons, PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional.
Our jurisprudence does not see the child in isolation, but as an extension and ward of his parents, not the state. Parham, 442 U.S. at 602-03 (parents are presumed to “act in their child's best interest”); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401. Children are not merely autonomous individuals needing the cacophony of alternate voices (e.g., state social services, guardian ad litems, educators, etc.) contending to speak on their behalf. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213; Parham, 442 U.S. at 606 (rejecting childhood by committee approach); Guggenheim, What's Wrong with Children's Rights 95 (e.g., assigning independent counsel for a toddler to advance the child's so-called interest is a legal fiction, as that grown-up lawyer assigned is merely advancing what that grown-up envisions as best for the child). Our Constitution rejects the notion that children receive independent consideration “absent a finding of neglect or abuse” by their parents. Parham, 442 U.S. at 604. For the same precise reasons, PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional.
The State and the parent do not stand in equipoise, or have an equal interest in the child. Yet, the State of New Jersey continues to claim that they have an equal interest in a select class of adult children & their custodial parents. Vivek S. Sankaran, Parens Patriae Run Amuck: The Child Welfare System's Disregard for the Rights of Non-Offending Parents, 82 Temple Law Review 55 (Spring 2009) (showing a historical rejection of broad parens patriae doctrine as case law on parental liberty interest was developed in Meyer, Pierce, Prince, Yoder). “The State's interest in caring for … children is de minimis if [the parent] is shown to be fit.” Stanley, 405 U.S. at 657-58 (the State “spites its own articulated goals” of child protection when it presumptively and arbitrarily removes children without a due process hearing). The State's parens patriae interest in promoting the welfare of the child is secondary and triggered only where parents have been determined unfit. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 767; For the same precise reasons, PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional.
POINT FIVE PARENTS HAVE A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO RAISE THEIR CHILDREN AS THEY SEE FIT, UNLESS A COURT DETERMINE’S A PARENT IS DEEMED UNFIT AND A POTENTIAL MAY OCCUR TO A CHILD
It is important to emphasize, that there is no Supreme Court precedent saying that Parents Fundamental Liberty Interest to child rearing & controlling the education of their children are lost or diminished in anyway by divorced or a family court proceeding. I will emphasize repeatedly, unmarried and divorcing parents retain the same fundamental rights as married parents. A noncustodial parent does not become less of parent if he or she decides not to pay for private or higher education for their child, or is not in the best interest of a child. A Parent's responsibility does not diminish and the rights which accompany that responsibility remain as well. As the U.S. Supreme Court articulated, “the tradition of parental authority is... one of the basic presuppositions of individual liberty." Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. at 638. The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children. PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional, because it intrudes upon the tradition of parental authority. It also fails to provide a presumption that parents act in the best interest of their children.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has acknowledged that the State lacks a compelling justification for an infringement on the fundamental rights of parents to raise their children as they see fit. See Watkins v. Nelson, 163 N.J. 235 (2000), the Watkins Court determined that only a showing of unfitness, abandonment, gross misconduct or exceptional circumstances would overcome the presumption in favor of the parent, and that "exceptional circumstances" requires proof of serious physical or psychological harm or a substantial likelihood of such harm. For the same precise reason, PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional. Absent a parent being proved unfit and or a potential harm to a child, the Court is without authority to make educational decisions over the objections of fit parents. Watkins explains that avoiding harm to the child is the polestar and the constitutional imperative that is necessary to overcome the presumption in favor of the parent's decision and to justify intrusion into family life. Yet, the State of New Jersey routinely materially interferes with a select class of fit unmarried and divorcing parents fundamental rights in controlling the education of their children, while intact married parents’ fundamental rights are respected. In. N J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 102 (2008), the Court recognized the right of a parents to raise a child and maintain a relationship with that child, without undue interference by the state, is protected by the United States and New Jersey Constitutions.
POINT SIX THE STATE’S PRESUMPTION THAT COLLEGE IS NECESSARY FOR A SELECT CLASS OF ADULT CHILDREN OF DIVORCE OR UNMARRIED PARENTS IS FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED.
The State of New Jersey has a presumption that college is necessary for a select class of adult children of divorce and unmarried families. If this was truly the case, and we lived in a utopian world, all adult children would be required to go to college and all fit parents would be required to foot the cost, not just a select class. As articulated in Yoder, the correct presumption is not that secondary education is necessary, but without it, would it impair the physical or mental health of the child, or result in an inability to be self-supporting or to discharge the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, or in any other way materially detract from the welfare of society? Id. at 205. For the same precise reason, PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional.
POINT SEVEN STATE’S SPECIAL INTEREST PRESUMPTION MUST ALSO BE REJECTED AND DEEMED REPUGNANT AND UNCONSTITIONAL

The State of New Jersey claims that they have a "special interest" in protecting children, and invoking the altruistic language of "best interest," or simply saying that "children have a right to be free from harm" are legally insufficient criteria for "children's rights" and elevating the role of the state into the lives of families. See Martin Guggenheim, What's Wrong with Children's Rights, passim (Harvard University Press 2005). Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 46 3 (1981)(so-called “best interests” standard offers little guidance to judges, and may effectively encourage them to rely on their own personal values). This is precisely the case, in the State of New Jersey. Troxel emphatically rejected the notion that a “best interest of the child” standard is enough for a judge to supplement the decision of a fit parent. The statist notion that government may supersede parental authority in order to ensure bureaucratically or judicially determined "best interests" of children has been rejected as repugnant to American traditions. Judges and state officials are ill-equipped to second guess parents and are precluded from intervening in absence of powerful countervailing interests. See Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1138 (Pa. Super. 1990), citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257-61, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 2991-93, 77 L.Ed. 2d 614, 623-29 (1982). See also Point Four. For the same precise reasons, PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional.
POINT SEVEN A PMSL IS REPUGNANT AND UNCONSTITIONAL UNDER ARTICILE VII, § 4, P P 1 & CONFLICTS WITH N.J.S.A. 18A-38-25
Under Article VIII, § 4, P 1, our State Constitution has established a Constitutional Right for all of its citizens to participate in free public education and has established compulsory attendance requirement that in no case extends to post-secondary education for children of married, unmarried or divorcing parents. See also, N.J.S.A. 18A-38-25, a parent’s compulsory obligation to educate a child terminates upon attaining the age of 16. I do not question the power of a State, having a high responsibility for providing free education of its citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education. However, the State’s only compelling interest with respect to a child’s education is constrained to N.J. Const. Article VIII, § 4, P 1, and N.J.S.A. 18A-38-25.
POINT EIGHT THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY HAS ONLY A DE MINIMIS INTEREST IN A CHILD’S COLLEGE EDUCATION WHEN THEIR PARENTS ARE DEEMED FIT

The State’s presumption that it has a strong interest in the outcome of disputes where the welfare of our young citizens is at stake is misplaced, nor constitutional. The State’s presumption in which they claim to have a strong interest in ensuring that a select class of adult children is educated & that college is necessary so that only a select class of adult children can become more productive members of our society is also constitutionally flawed. The correct constitutional presumption is that the State has little, if any, interest in caring for a child when the child's parent is fit. See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 248 (1978) (“The State's interest in caring for the children is ‘de minimis' if the parent is in fact a fit parent.”). In this case, both fit Parents are presumed to act in the best interest of their child. Thus, the State only has a de minimis interest, and is prevented from second guessing parental decisions. The Fourteenth Amendment prevents the State of New Jersey, from interfering with guaranteed liberty interest of parents to direct the education and upbringing of their children. See also Fawzy v. Fawzy, 199 N.J. 456, 473-475 (2009). For the same precise reasons, PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional.
POINT NINE PMSL IS REPUGNANT AND UNCONSITUTIONAL UNDER ARTICLE ONE AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE 14TH AMENDMENDMENT, AS IT TREATS DIVORCING AND UNMARRIED PARENTS DIFFERENTLY FROM CURRENT MARRIED PARENTS LIVING WITH THEIR CHILDREN.

PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional pursuant to Quilloin v. Walcott, 98 S Ct 549; 434 US 246, 255-56, (1978), the Court implied that "a (once) married father who is separated or divorced from a mother and is no longer living with his child" could not constitutionally be treated differently from a currently married father living with his child. PMSL on its face discriminates and impairs the exercise of unmarried and divorcing parents’ personal and fundamental rights to control the education of their children. See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972). For the same precise reason, PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional.
PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional pursuant to Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267 (1983), in which he Court stated:
(“We have held that these statutes [where mothers and fathers are treated disparately] may not constitutionally be applied in that class of cases where the mother and father are in fact similarly situated with regard to their relationship with the child.”).

PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional pursuant to Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989) (plurality opinion) (“The family unit accorded traditional respect in our society . . . includes the household of unmarried parents and their children”). Yet, the State fails in according the same respect to a select class of fit unmarried and divorcing parents.
POINT NINE A PMSL IS REPUGNANT AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT VIOLATES ARTICLE ONE AND THE EQUAL PROTECTON CLAUSE OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT
At one time, the State of New Jersey upheld both the State and Federal Constitution for all of its citizens. See Ziesel v. Ziesel, 115 A. 435 (N.J. 1921). As decades past, PMSL was developed under the guise of protecting the public interest with a utilitarian methodology that was distinctively political in nature, as well as monetary. In Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20, 37, 42 S. Ct. 449, 66 L. Ed. 817 (1922), the Court stated:
A reviewing court must strike down unconstitutional law even though that law is “designed to promote the highest good. The good sought in this unconstitutional law is an insidious feature, because it leads the courts and legislators of good purpose to promote it, without thought of the serious breach it will make in the ark of our covenant, or the harm which will come from breaking down recognized standards.
The unequal dispensation of fundamental rights of unmarried and divorcing parents can no longer be tolerated under our State and Federal Constitution. This Court is required to utilize the Equal Protection analysis articulated in Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415 (2006), and must hold beyond a reasonable doubt that PMSL is repugnant and violates Article One of the State Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause under the United States Constitution. As Justice Jackson noted, concurring in Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 -113 (1949), made a point:
"The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget today, that there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no better measure to assure that laws will be just than to require that laws be equal in operation."

Under the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution, all fit parents, regardless of their marital status are to be treated equally. As such, unmarried and divorcing parents retain the same fundamental rights as married parents. See Levy v. Louisiana , 88 S.Ct. 1509, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). Any statutory scheme which commands dissimilar treatment for men and women who are similarly situated involves the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Constitution. See also, Frontiero v. Richardson U.S, 93 S.Ct. 1746; 411. 677 (1973).
POINT TEN PMSL IS REPUGNANT AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT VIOLATES PARENTAL AUTOMONY AND PRIVACY RIGHTS OF A SELECT CLASS OF PARENTS
PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional pursuant to Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972), in which the Court implied:
"It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital relationship... . If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Id., at 453.
The concept of privacy or right to be left alone is deeply rooted in our heritage and it is founded upon historical notions and federal constitutional expressions of ordered liberty. Justice Brandeis, sometimes called the father of the idea of privacy, recognized this fundamental right of privacy when he wrote:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. . . They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone – the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S. Ct. 564, 572, 72 L. Ed. 944 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
The United States Supreme Court has fashioned a right of privacy which protects the decision-making or autonomy zone of privacy interests of the individual. The Court's decisions include matters concerning marriage, procreation, contraception, relationships, child rearing, and providing parents a fundamental right to control the education of their children under their control. To permit any governmental interference into these rights, there must be a powerful countervailing interest. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted this interest to mean that there must first be a showing of parental unfitness and a potential harm to the child as a result of the parents' decision. See Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84, (2003), discussing in detail that childrearing autonomy is rooted in the right to privacy. PMSL circumvents the holding in Fawzy v. Fawzy, 199 N.J. 456, 473-475 (2009), the Court state:
“Deference to parental autonomy means that the State does not second-guess parental decision making….[n]or does it impose its own notion of a child’s best interests on a family….Indeed the state has an obligation, under the parens patriae doctrine, to intervene where it is necessary to prevent harm to a child.”
The State of New Jersey does not deny that it routinely overrules educational decisions of a select class of fit unmarried and divorcing parents and imposes its own notion on what is the best interest of an adult child when it comes to college. Similarly, the State does not deny those intact married families’ fundamental rights in controlling the education of their children, and the freedom of personal choices. All parents have a historical right of freedom of personal choice in matters of family life. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753 (emphasizing this “Court's historical recognition that freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). The freedom of personal choice in this case, is a parent’s fundamental right to control the education of their children and, to their right to decide whether or not to contribute towards college. Intact married parents enjoy these rights. Yet, their adult children have no standing whatsoever to force their parents to assist them with college if they refused to do so. Here, the State lacks a compelling interest in second-guessing a fit parent's decision regarding college education for their adult children.
POINT ELEVEN PMSL IS REPUGNANT AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF A SELECT CLASS OF PARENTS
Our State Legislator has allowed the State to infringe upon the fundamental rights of a select class of fit parents to control the education of a child, simply because they believe a family court judge can make a better educational decision. As articulated in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944), there is a “private realm of family life which the state cannot enter” that has been afforded both substantive and procedural protection against arbitrary state intrusion into the intimate relationships of parents and children alike. Similarly, the Court admitted the high responsibilities are right of parents to control the upbringing of their children against that of the State, in which they stated:
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the State can neither supply nor hinder.


In this case, we have a similar situation that was faced in Troxel, a disagreement between two fit Parents. “PMSL” commands dissimilar treatment and discrimination to a select class of Fit Parents to be stripped of their fundamental right to control the education of a child, simply because the State has allowed a judge impliedly determine that they can make a better educational college decisions. It is axiomatic that there is an essential difference between the State and the family under our form of government. Each has a responsibility to govern within its sphere of authority. Simply because the decision of a parent is not agreeable to a child or because it involves risks does not automatically transfer the power to make that decision from the parents to some agency or officer of the state. In Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) Supreme Court of the United States said the following:
“The Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a judge believes a ‘better’ decision could be made.”

See Point Four and Point Seven. For the same precise reasons, PMSL is repugnant and unconstitutional.
POINT TWELVE PMSL IS REPUGNANT-UNCONSTITUTIONAL & VOID PURSUANT COOPER VS. AARON
Neither the Legislator nor the Executive Branch has the authority to overrule, or create legislation under the guise of protecting the public interest, that is contrary to rulings from the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution. It is respectfully submitted beyond a reasonable doubt, that New Jersey’s PMSL materially interferes & unquestionably discriminates against divorcing & unmarried parents’ fundamental rights and liberty interest to control the education of their children. The Supreme Court has provided every citizen a fundamental right to control the education of their children, without State interference. The 4th and 5th Amendments were described as protection against all governmental invasions of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. The Court referred to the 4th Amendment as creating a right to privacy, no less important than any other right carefully and particularly reserved to the people. Reaffirming the principles set forth in Pierce v. Society of Sisters and Meyers v Nebraska. Griswold v Connecticut 381 US 479 (1965).
As Jus¬tice Story explained 200 years ago, if state courts were permitted to disregard this Court’s rulings on federal law, “the laws, the treaties, and the constitution of the United States would be different in different states, and might, perhaps, never have precisely the same construction, obligation, or efficacy, in any two states. The public mis-chiefs that would attend such a state of things would be truly deplorable.” Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 348 (1816). For all the reasons articulated in this Brief, New Jersey’s “PMSL” is repugnant, unconstitutional & void, beyond a reasonable doubt, pursuant to Cooper vs. Aaron, 358 U.S. 178 S. Ct. 1401 (1958), in which:
The Court held if a judge does not fully comply with the Constitution, then his orders are void. The protection of the Federal Constitution extends to all. All State Legislature & Judges have an affirmative duty to obey rulings from the United States Supreme Court interpretation of the United States Constitution. A state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it. Chief Justice Marshall spoke for a unanimous Court in saying that: ‘If the legislatures of the several states may, at will, annul the judgments of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights acquired under those judgments, the constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery.’ United States v. Peters, 5 Cranch 115, 136, 3 L.Ed. 53.

The State of New Jersey does not have the power to suspend the Constitution, only the President of the United States can in a time of war. Unless the State of New Jersey can prove they have the authority to overrule the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution, the authority disregard the fundamental rights of unmarried or divorcing parents, the order compelling plaintiff(s) to pay for college contribution is void. See also Point Four & Seven. The U.S. Supreme Court in discussing the constitutionality of a state law that impinges upon a fundamental right held, “It is of course true that a law that impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly secured by the Constitution is presumptively unconstitutional. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).”
STRICT SCRUITY IS REQUIRED
Moriarty v. Bradt, 827 A.2d 203, 214–15 (N.J. 2003), Summing up when the State seeks, by statute, to interfere with family and parental autonomy, a fundamental right is at issue. That statute thus is subject to strict scrutiny and will only pass muster if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21; and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56.)

CONCLUSION
The idea of the American Dream is rooted in the United States Declaration of Independence which proclaims that "all men are created equal" and that they are "endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights" including "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. Since its founding in 1776, the United States has regarded and promoted itself as an Empire of Liberty and prosperity. Any healthy adult child has the ability to go to college with or without parental help. The adult child has the ability to work & earn a living. They have the option of going to college full or part time. They have the ability to apply for student loans & pay them back in due course, as would any Adult reaching the age of majority. They also have the ability to apply for grants. Finally, they have the ability to serve our military to help pay for college. It is true that it may be inconvenient for an adult child to pay his or her own way through private college, but there is no legal reason whatsoever why an Adult Child should not do so if otherwise healthy and able-bodied. An Adult Child is not in need of support merely because he or she is in school. A decision of parents as to whether or not the adult child should go to college & who shall pay for those educational expenses are matters of right that are purely personal, private, moral and guaranteed fundamental to the parents & the child. Indeed some parents are willingly & capable of assisting their children in obtaining a higher education, but any compulsory duty would offend the Parents guaranteed liberty interest to control the education of their child, notwithstanding that judges are prohibited from making child rearing educational decisions, unless a parent is unfit and a child can be potentially harmed.
“PMSL” appears to grant favoritism & special rights to a select class of custodial parents & their Adult Children, while totally disregarding our State and Federal Constitution. Our Legislator & Courts presumes these Adult Children are disadvantage. This presumption is misplaced and does not rise to a level of harm. The correct constitutional presumption is that a fit parent will act in the best interest of his or her child. Absent of harm or a parent being unfit, the State or the Court may not intervene in private educational disputes. Yet another issue deserves consideration here. While a regimen of legal protections for children whose parents abuse or neglect them is surely just and necessary, where did our state legislators and case law get the idea that the rights of children to their “best interests” are automatically superior to the fundamental Constitutional rights of their fit parents?
For reasons unknown, the State refuses to recognize that there is a presumption that fit parents act in their children's best interests, Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602; there is normally no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question fit parents' ability to make the best decisions regarding their children, see, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that the Amendment's Due Process Clause, like its Fifth Amendment counterpart, "guarantees more than fair process." Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997). The Clause also includes a substantive component that "provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests." Id., at 720; see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-302 (1993). PMSL is so beyond a reasonable doubt in conflict with the State & Federal Constitution that it should be stricken down as invalid. This Court is required to uphold your constitutional duty and protect the fundamental rights of all fit parents, not just married parents.
Respectfully submitted,

Att: Attorney's & Citizens-You have my permission to use everything I researched to challenged this repugnant and unconstitutional law. Any questions, email me at [email protected]

Giovanni LoPresti

My child support obligation was removed out of the system due to negligence and the probation officer NOT READING CORRECTLY.Im still waiting to have it put in the system.Essex County Probation office is very unpleasant the women sit around and gossip about your case as a matter of fact some of the men as well I heard them discussing my case and I am going to file a complaint.STILL MY OBLIGATION IS NOT IN THE SYSTEM AFTER PROBATION REMOVED IT.

I have been calling and calling trying to beg them to take my money 202.92
All they keep doing is giving the run around
I had to wait 2 weeks for a call back.
And got the same answer more run around BS
COME ON WHATS WITH THIS STATE
THERE ARE FAST TO PUT A WARRANT OUT
BUT WONT TAKE THE MONEY IM TRYING TO PAY
TO MANY EXCUSES
THE NEW SYSTEM NJ KID1 SUCKS
OVER PAID REJECTS

I understand that I owed child support. They took 11,000 of my taxes because they didn't report that they have 4,690 I owed. So it looks like it didn't pay when I did. These people need to stop messing with people's lives because they took all my tax money and right now I'm on disability I won't have a place to live.Plus she 22 years old and mother refuses to full time work.

I have been calling for 2 months with no avail!!!!!! Everything is automated and even when you get a live person they are of no help!!!!!
They have been taking money out of my ex's pay and not distributing the funds to our children. The are supposed to be advocates for these children and do nothing of the sort. As a single mother barely making ends meet on my salary THEY SHOULD BE ASHAMED of themselves. I work very hard to support my family and count on the measly funds that I receive!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

i have called nj child support since september to garnish my wages unemployment ect have been on the phone since then today date is 2/10/17 i was in the arrears an had tax offsets on was told i had to get it to zero before they would take the offset off i did on 2 /8/17 i was over paid 29 cents on 2/9/17 on i was back on the arrears which they said they couldnt take the arrears off i talked with a supervisor 6 times an she cant get it right i talked to case worker cant give me any answers i feel something has to be done with these stateworkers that just want to show up and take a paycheck without doing any of there jobs

1. After a parent pays, they take weeks to put it in your account. Why? Where is this money going first? Why children have to wait?

2. Welfare takes money from Child Support even after you have pay them in full. I have a court order that they have to give me back over $1,000 that they took and have not gotten 1 penny. Where is this money going? I called Child Support Hotline, they say to call welfare, I call welfare, they say to call the Hotline. So it was easy for them to take the money but they don't know how to pay me back. peopleofmiddlesexcountynj/facebook

I have a 4 missed payment order signed by Judge Harris and I have not gotten a payment since June. It is now almost October and the enforcement department will not enforce the judges order. I really do not understand what is going on. The excuses that they give are ridiculous.

I have been taking back and forth over and over about child support payments, he is as s were offset march 9 2016 still nothing applied to my account, this is bs. I don't owe tanf or anyone for that matter, yet you guys hold it like its yours, I s released it to you over 40,something DAYS now, wth? Are you trying to collect interest. Its an outrage and unfair to my children. I don't really think that you all give a damn frankly, I'm beyond pissed, now its time to make a statement, I'm tired of us single parent s getting a an over by you all. Enough is enough. You say you hold it 6 weeks to six months, for what? Unbelievable. After IRS holds it for 35 days max, there is no additional hold time allocated. I'm seeking a LAWYERS, IVE HAD IT UP TO HERE, YOU ARE A SHAM

I'm still paying child support my kids 27 25 23 years old I owe no back payments can't get in touch with nobody to talk to my case ld cs32166987b somebody help

I cannot sign in with the CORRECT information on the NJ child support website. This has been going on for at least 3 weeks. I only have the 800 number which will not allow me to talk to anyone because my pin will not work because your website is down and then the person will not allow me to speak to ANYONE! I need a number besides the 800 and I also need you to fix your website.

I did not authorize your agency to call me cell phone. I am being called all the time as a reminder my support is due. Im current on payments and do not want to receive these calls anymore. When I try to get through to your agency all I get is an automated line without an live operator. If im on the phone im not working get it? I have bills due so how about letting people get a live response.

I'm trying to make a payment, but I can't. I lost my pin. Every time I call the hotline 1-877-655-4371, I am put on hold for a long period of time. When I call back, leave my number for them to call me back, I get a call back and immediately put on hold again for a long time.
When I go to the website, I'm referred back to the hotline phone number. When I downloaded the app, I was referred to the hotline again. It's a joke.

The children of NJ deserve better treatment than you're agency is providing. Whoever is running this agency is as guilty as any deadbeat parent.